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CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN VENEZUELA: CAN
THE ICC BRING JUSTICE TO VENEZUELAN VICTIMS?
State parties to the Rome Statute submit to the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). This permanent and
autonomous Court tries individuals for heinous international
crimes, including crimes against humanity (CAH). Crimes such as
murder, imprisonment, or torture, when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack, are known as CAH.
Under the Statute, national jurisdictions are primarily responsible
for investigating and prosecuting those responsible for
international crimes. So, before it can assert jurisdiction, the ICC
must determine that a state party is unwilling or unable to
prosecute crimes against humanity in an effective way.
Allegations of CAH in Venezuela, a state party to the Statute,
have circulated in the news and social media since 2002. But in
2017, the widespread and systematic murder, imprisonment, and
torture, allegedly committed by Venezuelan security forces and
colectivos (armed government groups), caught the international
community’s attention. This Article argues that those crimes are
CAH, and that the Venezuelan judiciary is unwilling and unable
to genuinely prosecute the potential defendants. Accordingly, the
ICC must assert jurisdiction and try Venezuela’s President
Nicolás Maduro, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López, and
Interior Secretary Néstor Reverol for CAH.
Ayumary M. Fitzgerald 1

Ayumary M. Fitzgerald earned an undergraduate degree in law in 2002
at the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello. She also completed her
International LLM degree at SMU Dedman School of Law in 2016.
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INTRODUCTION

On March 29, 2017, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal
of Justice (TSJ) 2 stripped members of the oppositioncontrolled National Assembly 3 of their parliamentary
immunity and ruled it would assumed legislative powers.4
Protests began once the decision was publicized.
While Venezuelans peacefully took to the streets in
defense of their fundamental rights, the Maduro regime
responded strategically and systematically, targeting an
unarmed civilian population with violence and terror.5
Approximately, one person a day was killed since those
protests began, and there were more than 450 investigations
into human rights violations. 6 Reportedly, the systematic

U.S. Supreme Court equivalent.
U.S. Congress equivalent.
4
See Venezuela: OAS SG Denounces Self-inflicted Coup d’État,
ORGANIZATION+OF+AMERICAN+STATES+(Mar.+30,+2017),
http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E019/17 [hereinafter OAS Denounces Coup d’État]; Andrew V. Pestano,
Venezuela high court to take over National Assembly duties, UPI (Mar. 30,
2017),+https://www.upi.com/Venezuela-high-court-to-take-overNational-Assembly-duties/6171490883553; Rafael Romo, Venezuela's high
court dissolves National
Assembly, CNN (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/americas/venezuela-dissolvesnational-assembly/index.html.
5 The Collapse of the Rule of Law in Venezuela: What the United States and the
International Community Can Do to Restore Democracy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on W. Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Sec., Democracy,
Human Rights, and Glob. Women’s Issues of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of Luis Almagro Lemes,
Secretary General, Organization of American States), [hereinafter
Almagro’s Testimony at US Senate].
6 Id.
2
3

130

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 26

attacks were carried out by Venezuelan security forces and
colectivos in thirteen states and Caracas—including in
controlled environments such as military installations and
other state institutions. 7
Then on November 16, 2017, Venezuela’s deposed
Chief Prosecutor, Luisa Ortega Díaz petitioned the ICC to
investigate Maduro, Padrino López, and Reverol. 8 Ortega
alleged that "8,290 deaths took place between 2015 and June
2017 on government orders." 9 She charged the government
officials with "over 17,000 arbitrary and politically motivated
arrests, hundreds of cases of torture, and the general
paramilitarization of civilian population." 10 She also claimed
that "the crimes happened under the orders from the
executive branch” and that they “represent a broad
government strategy to cleanse dissident political views." 11
On February 7, 2018, the ICC prosecutor opened a
preliminary examination. 12

Crackdown on Dissent Brutality, Torture, and Political Persecution in
Venezuela,+HUMAN+RIGHTS+WATCH+(Nov.+29,+2017),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/29/crackdowndissent/brutality-torture-and-political-persecution-venezuela
[hereinafter Crackdown on Dissent].
8 David Zwier, Former Venezuela chief prosecutor files complaint against
nation's+president+in+ICC,+JURIST+(Nov.+17,+2017),
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2017/11/chicagoillinois-districtcourt-refuses-to-strike-down-doj-limit-on-funding-to-sanctuarycities.php.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 International Criminal Court, Statement of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda, on opening Preliminary
Examinations into the situations in the Philippines and in Venezuela, ICC
7
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The preliminary examination process is conducted
based on the facts and information available, as well as the
overarching principles of independence, impartiality and
objectivity.13 The analysis considers whether: (1) the Office
of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) information provides a reasonable
basis to believe that a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction
has been or is being committed [jurisdiction]; (2) the cases
may be admissible under Article 17 [admissibility]; and (3)
there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation
would serve the interests of justice, accounting for the
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims [interest of
justice]. 14 The prosecutor has indicated that she will rarely

(Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208otp-stat.
13 The Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, ¶
25 (November 2013),
http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/acb906/ [Hereinafter OTP Policy
Paper]. (Although she is not yet taking an investigation, the prosecutor
can seek additional information from states, U.N. organs, nonprofit
organizations, and other parties, as well as receive oral or written
testimony). Beth Van Schaak & Ronald C. Slye, International Criminal Law
and Its Enforcement Cases and Materials, 144 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter Van
Schaack] (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
[hereinafter Rome Statute] art. 15(2), July 17, 1998 and International
Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 104(2)).
14 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 53(1)(a)-(c); see also Van Shaack, supra
note 13, at 143 n.6 (explaining that Rule 48 of the Rule of Procedure and
Evidence of the ICC makes clear that in determining whether there is a
reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation under the prosecutors’
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decide not to proceed on an investigation based upon an
evaluation of the interest of justice, consequently this Article
will only address the jurisdiction and admissibility
requirements. 15
a. JURISDICTION
The ICC asserts jurisdiction over cases grounded on
subject matter, nationality or territoriality, and temporal
basis. 16 In her preliminary examination of the situation in
Venezuela, the prosecutor must find that all three
requirements are met to open an investigation. 17
ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the most
serious crimes concerning the international community:
genocide, CAH, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.18
Section III of this Article addresses this point fully and
concludes that CAH were committed by Maduro, Padrino
López, and Reverol, between April and August 2017.
As to nationality or territoriality, the ICC can exercise
jurisdiction over crimes committed on a state party’s

Art. 15 propio motus, the prosecutor must consider the factors set out in
Art. 53(1)(a)-(c)).
15 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 150. (“The Prosecutor will initiate an
investigation unless there are substantial reasons to believe that an
investigation would not serve the interests of justice when taking into
account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims.”). See Rome
Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 53(1)(c). (“The interest of justice is then a
countervailing consideration to the showing that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the requirements of complementarity and
gravity have been met.”).
16 Id. at 144.
17 Id.
18 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 5.
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territory or by a state party’s national. 19 The alleged CAH
were committed in Venezuela, and Maduro, Padrino López,
and Reverol are all Venezuelans. Since Venezuela is a State
party, the ICC can assert jurisdiction.
Finally, the ICC has temporal jurisdiction over events
that occurred after July 1, 2002. 20 Venezuela ratified the
Rome Statute on June 7, 2000, hence agreeing to submit to
the ICC’s jurisdiction with respect to CAH as of the Statute’s
effective date.21 So the ICC can assert jurisdiction for CAH
committed in Venezuela as of July 1, 2002. The CAH
allegedly committed by Maduro, Padrino López, and
Reverol between April and August 2017, are therefore
within the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction. Thus, in her
preliminary examination of the situation in Venezuela, the
OTP would likely establish all three jurisdictional
requirements.

Id. at Art. 12.
See id. at Art. 11(1). Unless a State has made a declaration accepting the
jurisdiction of the Court retroactively, if a State becomes a party to the
Statute after July 1, 2002, the Statute enters into force on the first day of
the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of its
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Id. at Art.
126(2).
21 See Preliminary Examination: Venezuela, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/venezuela
19
20
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b. ADMISSIBILITY
After establishing jurisdiction, the OTP’s analysis will
turn to admissibility. Admissibility is governed by Article 17
of the Statute and requires two inquiries: complementarity
and gravity. 22
i. COMPLEMENTARITY
The complementarity assessment is based on the
underlying facts, as they exist at the time of the
determination, and is subject to revision based on changed
circumstances. 23 In a preliminary examination, the OTP
considers (1) whether a state has jurisdiction over the cases
but is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute the
accused; (2) if the state with jurisdiction has investigated and
decided not to prosecute because it is unwilling or unable to
genuinely prosecute the accused; and (3) if the accused has
already been tried, whether an ICC trial would not be
permitted under Article 20(3) of the Rome Statute. 24 Here,

Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 145. In a preliminary examination, the
OTP assesses admissibility regarding potential cases. Id. Once the
prosecutor decides to investigate, the admissibility analysis turns to the
particular suspects and cases before the court. Id.
23 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 15 ¶ 58 (relying on Regulation
29(4), Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor; Prosecutor v. Germain
Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment, ¶
56 (Sept. 25, 2009).
24 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 17(1)(a)-(c). Also, Article 20(3)
contains the ne bis in idem principle or rule against double jeopardy. The
Rome Statute provides two exceptions to the rule: (1) when a trial took
place to shield the accused from ICC jurisdiction over the crime; or (2)
when a trial was not conducted independently or impartially to bring the
22
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the double jeopardy principle contained in Article 20(3) will
not concern the prosecutor’s preliminary examination
because Venezuelan authorities have never tried,
investigated, or prosecuted the potential defendants.
Venezuela has jurisdiction to investigate and
prosecute the crimes alleged in this Article because they
were committed in its territory. So, during the preliminary
examination, the OTP must consider the genuineness of an
investigation and prosecution in Venezuela. The principle is
that states bear the primary responsibility for preventing
and punishing crimes, while proceedings before the ICC
should remain exceptional. 25 Consequently, where national
systems remain inactive or are otherwise unwilling or
unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute, the ICC must
fill the gap left by the state’s failure to satisfy its duty. 26
The admissibility determination is not a judgment on
the national justice system. 27 Hence if a functioning justice
system is not investigating or prosecuting the relevant cases,
the determining factor is the absence of relevant
proceedings. 28 The absence of national proceedings for the
same person and same conduct is then sufficient to make the
case admissible. 29 On this basis alone, the prosecutor could
open an investigation because the potential defendants here,
have never been investigated or prosecuted in Venezuela.

accused to justice. These exceptions are also captured under Article
17(2)(a)-(c).
25 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 23 ¶ 100.
26 Id. at 23 ¶ 100.
27 Id. at 12 ¶ 46.
28 Id.
29 See id. at 12 ¶ 47 (relying on Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui).
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But the assessment about a state’s inability or
unwillingness to prosecute must be based on concrete facts,
as they exist at the time of the review. 30 To determine
inability, the OTP may consider if due to a substantial
collapse or unavailability of its judicial system, Venezuela is
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence or is
unable to carry out its proceedings. 31 To determine
unwillingness, the OTP may consider principles of
international law and whether proceedings in Venezuela
would shield the accused, be unjustifiably delayed, or would
not be conducted independently or impartially and thus
would not bring the accused to justice. 32
Further, the OTP may consider, inter alia, the ability of
the competent authorities to exercise their judicial powers in
Venezuela; the absence of security for witnesses,
investigators, prosecutors and judges; the absence of the
required legislative framework to prosecute the same
conduct that the ICC plans to pursue; the lack of adequate
resources for effective investigations and prosecutions; as
well as violations of fundamental rights of the accused. 33
When assessing unwillingness and inability, the OTP

See id. at 12 ¶ 47 (relying on Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., Decision on
the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, ICC-02/0401/05-377, 10 March 2009, ¶¶ 49-52).
31 Rome Statute, supra note 14, Art. 17(3).
32 See id. at Art. 17(2)(a)-(b).
33 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 14 ¶ 57 (relying on Prosecutor v.
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, “Decision on the
Admissibility of the Case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi”, ICC-01/1101/11-344-Red, 31 May 2013, ¶¶ 199-215; Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam
Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, “Decision on the Admissibility of the
Case against Abdullah Al-Senussi”, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, 11
October 2013, ¶ 235).
30
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considers whether any or a combination of those factors may
impact the proceedings as to vitiate their genuineness. 34
III.

The Venezuelan Government Is Unwilling Or Unable
To Genuinely Prosecute Maduro, Padrino López, And
Reverol Because There Is No Effective Separation Of
Powers. The Maduro Regime Controls The Public
Powers—Particularly, The Judiciary.

Venezuela’s national public power is divided into
Legislative (National Assembly), Executive, Judicial, Citizen
(Ciudadano), and Electoral.35 The Citizen power is performed
by the Republic’s Moral Council, which is composed by the
People’s Defender, the Republic’s General Controller, and
the Chief Prosecutor.36 The Chief Prosecutor is appointed by
a two third vote of the National Assembly 37 and directs the
public ministry for a period of seven years. 38 The public
ministry investigates and prosecutes criminal conduct. 39
Although there is a constitutional division of powers,
the Maduro regime effectively controls the judiciary. Efforts
to control the judiciary began in 2004, when (then) president
Hugo Chávez and partisan lawmakers expanded the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) from twenty to thirty-two

See id. at 14 ¶ 58.
CONSTITUTION OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, Art. 136
https://www.oas.org/juridico/mla/sp/ven/sp_ven-int-const.html
[hereinafter Venezuelan Constitution].
36 Id. Art. 273. The Chief Prosecutor is the U.S. Attorney General
equivalent.
37 Id. at Art. 279.
38 Id. at Art. 284.
39 Id. at Art. 285.
34
35
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members and filled the new seats with supporters. 40 Then in
2010, Chávez’s lawmaker supporters accelerated the process
for naming new TSJ justices, 41 and before the National
Assembly was installed that year, selected nine new TSJ
justices. 42
Maduro’s political control over the TSJ translates
directly into control over lower courts because the TSJ
effectively controls the appointment and removal of lower
court judges. 43 In 2010, the TSJ’s Judicial Commission voided
the appointment of 67 judges and appointed 1064
nonpermanent judges. 44 Then, in March 2012, the TSJ
appointed 89 additional provisional judges. 45 The
Commission has also granted stability of tenure to hundreds
of provisional and temporary judges. 46 These new positions
were not won through open competitions, as required by the
Venezuelan constitution, but rather through promotions of

Tightening the Grip: Concentration and Abuse of Power in Chavez's
Venezuela, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCh (Jul. 17, 2012), http://
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/venezuela0712webwcover.p
df [hereinafter Tightening the Grip].
41 See id. at 10 (explaining that voters had reduced the pro-Chávez
majority in the National Assembly from close to 100% to approximately
60% of the seats, so they made this move only five days after the
legislative elections).
42 See id. at 11 (explaining that to create the new vacancies, the TSJ gave
several justices authorization to retire before the conclusion of their
constitutional 12-year terms).
43 See id.
44 Id. at 11, n. 7.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 12.
40
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provisional and temporary judges who had been appointed
at the full discretion of the Commission. 47
The authorities’ failure, interference, intimidation,
and arbitrary suspensions have undermined the
independence and impartiality of Venezuela’s judges and
prosecutors. 48 According to the International Commission of
Jurists (ICJ), the lack of security of tenure and transparency
in the selection of prosecutors, as well as the allocation of
criminal investigations ignoring the prosecutor’s experience
and workload, have yielded the prosecutor’s inability or
unwillingness to bring criminals to justice in an effective and
equal manner. 49 Additionally, with 70% of judges holding
only provisional or temporary office, there is a climate of
insecurity and impunity that surpasses 90% concerning
common felonies, and even more for crimes involving
violations of human rights. 50
Likewise, the Maduro Regime controls the Citizen
and Legislative powers. The regime has gained control
leveraging similar techniques as those used by Chávez. For
instance, in December 2014—although the Constitution
requires a two-thirds vote—the pro-Maduro National
Assembly appointed the People’s Defender and the

Id.
Venezuela: weak legal system threatens democracy, INTL. COMMISSION OF
JURISTS (Jun. 5, 2014), https://www.icj.org/venezuela-weak-legalsystem-threatens-democracy-and-human-rights-reforms-urgentlyneeded-new-report-says/ [hereinafter ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal
system].
49 See id.
50 Id.
47
48
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Republic’s General Controller, and ratified Luisa Ortega as
Chief Prosecutor with just a simple majority. 51
Surprisingly, in December 2015, for the first time in
seventeen years, the Venezuelan opposition won control of
the National Assembly, altering the balance of power. 52 But
this only accelerated Maduro’s plan to control the public
powers in Venezuela. In January 2017, Maduro announced
an “economic state of emergency,” that allowed him to rule
by decree. 53 Then in February 2017, the TSJ bypassed the
National Assembly to grant Maduro broad emergency
powers over the economy. 54 And in late March 2017, the TSJ
stripped the opposition-controlled National Assembly’s
members of their parliamentary immunity and ruled that it
would assume legislative powers. 55 Although the court

51Chavismo

elige por mayoría simple a fiscal general, defensor y contralor, EL
NUEVO+HERALD+(Dec.+22,+2014),
http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/mundo/americalatina/venezuela-es/article4824984.html.
52 Peter Wilson, Venezuela's opposition wins legislative majority, USA TODAY
(Dec.+7,+2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/12/07/venezuel
a-opposition-victory/76909468/.
53 Frances Martel, Venezuela Declares “Economic emergency” That Allows
President to Rule by Decree, BREITBART (Jan. 16, 2016),
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/01/18/venezueladeclares-economic-emergency/.
54 Assoc. Press in Caracas, Venezuela under 'economic emergency' as court
gives Maduro decree powers, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 11, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/12/venezuela-undereconomic-emergency-as-court-gives-maduro-decree-powers.
55 See Pestano, supra note 4, at 1(reporting that the TSJ accused the
legislative body of overstepping its authority—primarily citing the
opposition's efforts to remove Maduro from power—and held it in
contempt. Ironically, the next day, Maduro “interceded” to undo,
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rescinded a portion of that ruling, Maduro subsequently
announced his plan to provide plenary power to a new
national constituent assembly that could re-write the
constitution. 56 Finally, in August 2017, 545 delegates of the
new national constituent assembly, elected under suspected
fraud, were sworn in the legislative palace. 57 The new
constituent immediately dismissed Chief Prosecutor Luisa
Ortega Diaz. 58

convening an emergency late-night dialogue, after which the court
rescinded a portion of its ruling on the morning of April 1, 2017); Romo,
supra note 4, at 1; see also OAS Denounces Coup d’État, supra note 4, at 1
(reporting that the OAS Secretary General called for the urgent
convocation of the Permanent Council under Article 20 of the
Democratic Charter and stated that the situation has reached this point
despite the warnings outlined in the reports of May 30, 2016 and March
14, 2017).
56 See Julia Jones & Stefano Pozzebon, Venezuelans reject constitutional
rewrite
in
non-binding
referendum,
CNN
(Jul.
17,
2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/17/americas/venezuela-referendumvotes/index.html (reporting that over seven million of Venezuelans
voted in a non-binding referendum organized by the country's main
opposition parties. The overwhelming majority voted against Maduro's
plan. Maduro, of course, called the vote "a meaningless internal
exercise."); see also Colin Dwyer, In Unofficial Vote, Venezuelans
Overwhelmingly Reject Constitutional Rewrite, NPR (Jul. 17, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/07/17/537657163/in-unofficial-vote-venezuelansoverwhelmingly-reject-constitutional-rewrite.
57 Cody Weddle & Patricia Mazzei, Venezuela installs new all-powerful
assembly rejected by U.S., MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 04, 2017),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/venezuela/article165446552.html
58 Patricia Mazzei, Chief prosecutor ousted as new Venezuelan assembly
targets+Maduro+foes,+MIAMI+HERALD+(Aug.+05,+2017),
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Hence, in its preliminary examination, the OTP will
likely find complementarity based on the Venezuelan
judiciary’s unwillingness to investigate and prosecute these
potential defendants because the Maduro regime effectively
controls the public powers. 59 The regime controls the courts
and the courts have manipulated the Venezuelan
constitution and laws to consolidate all governmental
authority under the regime’s control. 60 Additionally, the
OTP will likely find complementarity because, the
Venezuela judiciary’s substantial collapse renders it unable
it to prosecute heinous CAH. In Venezuela, there is a clear
absence of security for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors
and judges, 61 as well as a lack of adequate resources for and

http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/venezuela/article165653222.html
59 See Secretary General Updated Report on Venezuela to the Permanent
Council,+OAS+1-73,+1+(Mar.14,+2017)+OSG/128-17,
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-VZ-II-EnglishFinal-Signed.pdf [hereinafter OAS Second Report](“The rule of law no
longer exists in Venezuela; it has been eliminated by a judiciary under
the complete control of the Executive Branch that has invalidated every
law passed by the National Assembly along with its constitutional
powers”).
60 Id. at 2; ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal system, supra note 48, at 1; see also
OAS Secretary General Invoked Democratic Charter and Convened
Permanent Council on Venezuela OSG-243-16, 1-114, 65, May 30, 2016
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OSG-243.en.pdf
[hereinafter OAS First Report] (“there is currently no clear separation
and independence of the branches of government in Venezuela, with the
co-opting of the Judicial branch by the Executive branch being one of the
clearest cases of this”).
61 OAS Second Report, supra note 59, at 2; ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal
system, supra note 48, at 1.
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effective investigation and prosecution, 62 particularly of this
magnitude.
a. GRAVITY
The gravity assessment is the key to distinguish
crimes investigated by the ICC and crimes investigated in
domestic systems. 63 In this analysis, the OTP focuses on the
crimes’ scale, nature, manner of commission, and impact. 64
These four factors are set in the ICC’s precedent and in
OTP’s Regulation 29(2). 65
To assess the crimes’ scale, the OTP considers the
number of direct and indirect victims, the extent of the
harm—particularly, the bodily or psychological harm caused
to the victims and their families—and their geographical or
temporal spread.66 As to the crimes’ nature, the OTP
considers each offense’s specific elements. 67

ICJ’s Venezuela: weak legal system, supra note 48, at 1.
Stuart Ford, What Investigative Resources Does the International Criminal
Court Need to Succeed?: A Gravity-Based Approach, 16 WASH. U. GLOBAL
STUD. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017).
64 Id. at 11 (relying on Prosecutor v. Abu Garda, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-Red,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 31 (Feb. 8, 2010)). See also
Regulation 29(2), Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/0501-09,+Effective+Apr.+23,+2009+https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/FFF97111-ECD6-40B5-9CDA792BCBE1E695/280253/ICCBD050109ENG.pdf [hereinafter Regulation
29(2)].
65 Regulation 29(2), supra note 64; see also OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13,
at 15 ¶ 61 (explaining that the assessment of gravity includes both
quantitative and qualitative considerations).
66 OTP Policy Paper, supra note 13, at 16 ¶ 62.
67 Id. at 15 ¶ 63.
62
63
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Further, to assess the crimes’ manner of commission,
the OTP considers the means employed to execute the crime,
the perpetrator’s degree of participation and intent, and the
extent to which the crimes were systematic, resulted from a
plan or organized policy, or resulted from abuse of power or
official capacity. 68 The OTP also considers the use of cruelty,
the victims’ vulnerability, any motives involving
discrimination, or the use of rape and sexual violence as a
means of destroying groups. 69 Finally, to assess the crimes’
impact, the prosecutor considers the sufferings victims
endured and their increased vulnerability; the terror
subsequently instilled, or the social, economic and
environmental damage inflicted on the affected
communities. 70
During its preliminary examination, the OTP will
likely find that the alleged crimes meet the scale requirement
because the harm caused to the victims and their families
extended to hundreds of civilians killed and tortured, as
well as thousands unlawfully imprisoned. 71 These
approximate stats are demonstrative: 167 deaths were
reported in connection with civilian demonstrations, 72 3,589

Id.
Id. at 15-16 ¶ 64.
70 Id. at 16 ¶ 65.
71 See Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54; see also OAS, Fourth
Report on Venezuela OSG/ 445-17, 1-40, 5-6, Sep. 25, 2017
http://scm.oas.org/pdfs/2017/CP38157REPORT.pdf [hereinafter OAS
Fourth Report]; OAS, Third Report on Venezuela, 1-55, 19, 1 Jul. 19, 2017
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/TERCER-INFORMEVENEZUELA-ENGLISH-Final-signed.pdf [hereinafter OAS Third
Report].
72 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54.
68
69
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people were arrested in the demonstrations (as of July 4,
2017), 73 16,000 were injured, thousands were victims of
violence; 74 and at least 120 new cases of people tortured by
various security agencies were reported.75 Additionally, the
crimes large geographical or temporal spread includes
criminal conduct committed over the course of, at least, five
months and carried out, repeatedly, in thirteen states and
Caracas. 76

OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19
OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5-6; compare Ford, supra note 63, at
28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr,
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010))
(explaining that the ICC’s investigation about the situation in Kenya
covered attacks by groups associated with two rival political parties that
took place in the aftermath of a disputed election).
75 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33. The Centre for Studies and
Analysis for Latin America (CASLA) has been denouncing to the ICC the
systematic torture by the Venezuelan government since July 2016. Id.;
compare Ford supra note 63 at 28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome
Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) (explaining that in Kenya, more than
1,100 people were killed, at least 900 were raped, more than 3,500 were
seriously injured, and more than 350,000 were displaced from their
homes. And the killings, rapes and sexual violence were often done in a
particularly brutal fashion).
76 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1; compare Ford supra note 63 at
28 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr,
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010))
(explaining that, similarly, in Kenya, the attacks took place all over the
country over a period of approximately two months, although the
investigation apparently focused on fifteen locations).
73
74
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Likewise, the OTP will likely find that the crime’s
nature is met because the alleged conduct meets the
enumerated crimes of Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.77
Section III of this Article argues in detail that Maduro,
Padrino López and Reverol could be held responsible for
murder, imprisonment, and torture.
Moreover, the OTP will likely find that the alleged
crimes meet the manner of commission factor because the
crimes were systematic attacks resulting from state policy.
Reportedly, the Venezuelan government’s strategic and
systematic target of unarmed civilians resulted in one or two
protestors killed each day. 78 Section III(b) of this Article
argues this point extensively, but the following reports are
illustrative. For instance, between April and July 2017, the
Venezuelan government deployed an excessive number of
military and police officers throughout the country, as well
as armored vehicles known as “whales” or “rhinoceroses”,
which were used offensively to disperse protestors. 79
The government also leveraged an indiscriminate and
excessive use of tear gas canisters; officers used the
containers of toxic gases, not only to disperse people, but to
fire them directly and point-blank at the demonstrators,

See Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1)(a) (murder), (e)
(imprisonment), (f) (torture).
78 OAS Third Report supra note 71, at 1.
79 Id. at 18-19.
Human rights violations and abuses in the context of protests in the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela from 1 April to 31 July 2017, COMMISSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS+(8,+Aug.+2017),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/VE/HCReportVenezuel
a_1April-31July2017_EN.pdf [hereinafter OHCHR Report].
77
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seriously injuring and even killing some people. 80 This
conduct will likely lead the OTP to finding that the attacks
resulted either from a plan or organized policy, or from
abuse of power or official capacity. 81
Finally, the OTP will likely find that the alleged
crimes meet the impact factor. In Venezuela, at least two
million displaced persons have had to emigrate for social,
economic, and political reasons. 82 54% of all children are
malnourished. 83 And as of July 25, 2017, there were 620
political prisoners; more than 430% as compared to the 117
political prisoners accounted for prior to the start of the
demonstrations in April 2017. 84
In sum, in addition to complementarity, the OTP is
likely to find gravity and establish admissibility. 85 Yet, to

OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19; compare Ford, supra note 63, at
28-29 (relying on Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr,
Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010))
(explaining that, like in Venezuela, in Kenya, the victims were largely
civilians who were targeted because of their actual or perceived support
for a rival group); see also OHCHR Report, supra note 82, at 20 (reporting
that in some cases, people were arrested even though they were not
demonstrating, just because they were perceived to support the
opposition).
81 See OTP Policy Paper, supra note 70 at 13 ¶ 63.
82 OAS Fourth Report, supra note, 71 at 5-6.
83 Id. at 5-6.
84 Id. at 5.
85 See Ford, supra note 63, at 29 (relying on Situation in the Republic of
Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, Decision Pursuant to Art. 15 of the Rome
Statute on Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010)) (explaining that regarding the Kenya
investigation, the OTP concluded that the alleged acts constituted CAH
and met the gravity threshold).
80
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open an investigation, the OTP must find reasonable basis to
believe that the alleged crimes are CAH under Article 7. The
following section demonstrate this point.
IV.

SOS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN VENEZUELA.

After World War I, humanity has sought to
criminalize individual conduct for heinous crimes
committed by state actors that are the product of state action
and policy; CAH is such heinous crime. 86 The ICC can assert
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute CAH when any of
the crimes enumerated in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute—
such as murder, imprisonment, or torture—are committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population, with knowledge of the attack. 87
a. ENUMERATED CRIMES
i. MURDER, ARTICLE 7(1)(A)
STATUTE.

OF THE

ROME

M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity Historical Evolution and
Contemporary Application, CAMBRIGE (2011). Generally, to reach the
heinous nature of an international crime, the criminal conduct must
directly or indirectly threaten the international community’s peace and
security; shock the international community’s conscience; affect multiple
state’s public safety and economic interests; involve more than one
state’s citizens; or require international cooperation because the criminal
conduct’s is the product of state policy. Id. at 8-9. The OTP considers
some of these factors when assessing gravity because gravity serves as
the key to distinguish crimes investigated by the ICC from crimes
investigated in domestic systems. See Ford, supra note 63, at 5.
87 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1).
86
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Murder is an intentional killing without lawful
justification 88 that may be committed by act or omission.89
Lawful justification involves excuses and defenses under
customary criminal practice of the states, such as selfdefense, coercion, necessity, and reasonable mistake of law
or fact.90 The death of the victim can be inferred from the
facts to the case, but the prosecutor must prove the causal
link between the killing and the death of the victim. 91
Between April and August 2017, at least 167 deaths
were reported in connection with the demonstrations in
Venezuela. 92 As of July, security forces were allegedly
responsible for at least fourty-six killings and colectivos for
twenty-seven. 93 On July 30, 2017, alone, the day the
constituent assembly members were elected, at least twentynine people were killed. 94 Reportedly, 67 people were killed
by firearms or by another type of projectile; thirty were aged
twenty-one or younger; at least twenty-four were students
and approximately fourteen were eighteen or younger. 95

Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 365.
Id. at 372 (relying on Prosecution v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 132 Jun. 15, 2009;
Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, ¶ 421, Sep. 30, 2008).
90 Id. at 365.
91 Id. at 372 (relying on Prosecution v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/0501/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 132 Jun. 15, 2009).
92 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54.
93 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 10-11; Crackdown on Dissent, supra
note 7, at 54-55.
94 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54.
95 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 25. Of those who were not killed
by firearms, at least eight were electrocuted and seventeen died of other
wounds or accidents. Id.
88
89
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Security forces systematically used their service
weapons, less-lethal weapons (e.g. tear gas cans), and
firearms with less-lethal ammunition (such as plastic pellets)
to shoot at demonstrators at a close range, aiming at
vulnerable parts of the body.96 For instance, reportedly, on
April 26, 2017, a Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) officer,
fired a tear-gas projectile, designed to be fired at long range,
into Juan Pablo Pernalete’s chest from only fifteen meters
away, killing him at impact. 97 Similarly, on June 22, 2017, a
GNB officer shot David Vallenilla in the thorax with a
buckshot from the other side of a fence at an Air Force base
in Caracas. 98

OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12.
Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 57 (reporting that Juan Pablo
was a 20-year-old basketball player and public accounting student who
was participating in an anti-government demonstration in Altamira,
Caracas. The report also states that (then) Chief Prosecutor, Luisa Ortega
Díaz, established that a GNB officer indeed fired the fatal round);
OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12; see also Crackdown on Dissent,
supra note 7, at 58 (similarly reporting that on June 17, 2017, 17-year-old,
Neomar Lander was separated from his mother when GNB and
Bolivarian National Police (PNB) officers moved to disperse the
demonstration. She later found him dead and described him with a
“hole” in his chest that was “just too big”).
98 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 13 (stating that the act was recorded
in video footage which showed David approaching the perimeter fence
to throw what looked like a rock. The Chief Prosecutor’s Office reported
that the 20-year-old was hit by buckshot in the thorax and ordered the
detention of a Sargent of the Bolivarian Air Force. A criminal court in
Caracas issued an arrest warrant against the Sargent, which had not been
complied with at the time of the report); see also Crackdown on Dissent,
supra note 7, at 57 (similarly reporting that on August 13, 2017, 16-yearold student and soccer player, Luis Guillermo Espinoza, died several
weeks after a GNB officer shot him in the head at point blank range
96
97
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So the OTP will likely find that Venezuelan armed
security forces intentionally killed demonstrators, without
lawful justification, 99 when they systematically used their
service weapons to shoot at demonstrators, at a close range,
aiming at vulnerable parts of the body.100
ii. IMPRISONMENT, ARTICLE 7(1)(E)
ROME STATUTE.

OF THE

Imprisonment is the unlawful deprivation of liberty
of an individual without due process of law. 101 The
deprivation of liberty can be achieved by an act or omission
with the intent to deprive the civilian of his physical liberty
without due process of law. 102 It can also be achieved with
reasonable knowledge that the act or omission was likely to
cause a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 103

during a demonstration in San Diego, Carabobo state. Luis was trying to
run away from GNB members on June 5 when three motorcycles
surrounded him. Luis resisted the officers’ beating and then tried to run
away. “One officer pointed his gun at Luis’s head and he stopped for a
second,” “[t]he guard turned his head and Luis began to run again,”
then a witness heard the shot and saw Luis on the floor).
99 See Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 365.
100 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 12.
101 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 444 (relying on Prosecutor v. Kordic &
Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 192, Feb. 26, 2001).
102 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9. Trial Judgment, ¶¶
64-5, Oct. 17, 2003).
103 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9. Trial Judgment, ¶¶
64-5, Oct. 17, 2003).
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To find imprisonment, the OTP considers several
factors and Article 7’s express mandate. 104 The factors
include whether the arrest was the result of a valid warrant;
whether detainees were informed of the reasons for the
detention; whether formal charges were filed; whether the
detainees were informed of their procedural rights, and
whether the continued detention was lawful. 105
Additionally, Article 7 expressly prohibits imprisonment
that is contrary to international law and other “other severe
deprivation of physical liberty.” 106
In Venezuela, thousands of protesters and bystanders
were unlawfully detained during the demonstrations, and
many were subsequently prosecuted in military courts.107
Again, approximately 3,589 were arrested in the
demonstrations, 108 and as of July 25, 2017, there were
approximately 620 political prisoners. 109 Reportedly,
colectivos— civilian armed groups with no power to arrest
under Venezuelan law—aided police and GNB officers’
unlawful detentions. 110
There were multiple violations including the lack of
arrest warrants, incommunicado detention, lack of access to
legal counsel, and breaches of the principle of presumption

Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, ¶¶
119-22, Mar. 15, 2002).
105 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25, Judgment, ¶¶
119-22, Mar. 15, 2002).
106 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(1)(e); see also Bassiouni supra
note 87, at 444.
107 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1.
108 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 19.
109 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5.
110 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 51.
104
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of innocence. 111 The UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) recorded multiples unlawful detentions
including: Caracas (766), Zulia (630), Carabobo (608),
Anzoátegui (413), Miranda (405), Lara (337), Táchira (334),
Bolívar (271), and Aragua (269). 112
The OHCHR recorded multiple other irregularities.
For instance, security forces arrested people without a court
order and later claimed they had been caught in flagrante
delicto; people were arrested on their way to demonstrations;
others were detained while they were peacefully
demonstrating; others were apprehended hours after they
had taken part in a demonstration. 113 In some cases, people
were arrested even though they were not demonstrating,
just because they were perceived to support the Venezuelan
opposition. 114
Hence the OTP will likely find that under the state
policy of the Maduro regime, state forces aided by colectivos
imprisoned civilians or severely deprived them of their
physical liberty. It will likely also find that officers
committed unlawful arrests, without a valid warrant or
informing of the reasons for the detention. 115 Further, it will
likely find that official arrests included incommunicado
detention, lack of access to legal counsel and breaches of the
principle of presumption of innocence. 116 And the
deprivation of liberty was directed against those who

OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 20.
Id.
113 Id. (According to the OHCHR, a medical doctor witnessed national
guards entering hospitals to arrest injured protestors).
114 Id.
115 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 51.
116 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 20.
111
112
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protested against the Maduro regime, or were perceived to
support the opposition. 117
iii. TORTURE, ARTICLE 7(1)(F)
STATUTE.

OF THE

ROME

Under the Statute, the definition of torture as a CAH
does not require specific purpose, unlike the definition of
torture as a war crime. 118 Torture means the intentional
infliction of severe pain or suffering, physical or mental,
upon a person in custody or under control of the accused,
which is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions. 119
The conduct must cause an important degree of pain and
suffering to amount to torture [actus reus]. 120 The infliction of
pain or suffering must be intentional [mens rea]. 121
On June 15, 2017, the Centre for Studies and Analysis
for Latin America (CASLA) reported an increase in torture in
Venezuela since April 2017. 122 Reportedly, once the victims
were detained, government agents subjected detainees to
severe infliction of pain and suffering, including severe

Id.
Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 418 (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges,
¶ 194-95 Jun. 15, 2009).
119 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7(2)(e).
120 Bassiouni, supra note 87, at 418 (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Decision on the confirmation of charges,
¶ 193 Jun. 15, 2009).
121 Id. (relying on Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/0815, Decision on the confirmation of charges, ¶ 194-95 Jun. 15, 2009 and
explaining that it excludes the requirement of knowledge set out in
Article 30(3) of the Statute).
122 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33.
117
118
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beatings, electric shocks, and asphyxiation among others.123
CASLA reported at least 120 new cases of people tortured by
various security agencies, particularly, by the GNB, PNB, the
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service (SEBIN), and some
local police from states and cities whose authorities are
members of the government party. 124 According to CASLA,
the officers’ intention was not only to carry out orders but
also to do the greatest possible physical damage, to punish
their victims for demonstrating, and even as vengeance. 125
The officers applied systematic and gruesome
methods of torture on detainees. First, officers applied toxic
or tear gas powder directly to the victim’s face, which was
then covered with plastic bags to make the effect even more
overwhelming. 126 Second, the officers shut the victims up in
very small spaces (small armored cars, or together in groups
in rooms no bigger than 2 meters x 2 meters) until they
fainted or had serious respiratory difficulties. 127 Third,
officers pushed toxic powder into their victims’ nostrils to
force them to open their mouths to breathe, and then forced
them to eat human excrement. 128 Lastly, officers threw tear
gas canisters at their victims inside armored vehicles, where
the victims were being detained, and then shut the vehicle’s
door causing them to asphyxiate and faint. 129

Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 1.
OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33. The Centre for Studies and
Analysis for Latin America (CASLA) has been denouncing to the ICC the
systematic torture by the Venezuelan government since July 2016. Id.
125 Id. at 33-34.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33-34.
129 Id.
123
124
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The threat or perpetration of sexual violence as
torture was another systematic form of abuse reported on
detainees. 130 80% of the new cases CASLA reported included
claims by detainees that they had been stripped naked,
threatened, or raped by officers. 131
Other forms of systematic torture included hits to the
victim’s heads with the butts of weapons, helmets and blunt
objects. Reports of kicks to the face, ribs and lumbar region
were systematic in 100% of the cases presented. 132 Electric
shocks to the genitals, head and elbows, forcing victims to
kneel or lie down to get at them more easily, handcuffing
them hand and foot, covering their heads, or suspending
them by the arms and allowing them to touch the floor only
with the tips of their toes for hours on end, were also
systematically practiced. 133
Hence it is likely that the OTP will find that under the
Maduro regime’s state policy, officers inflicted a significant
degree of pain and suffering upon civilians while they were
in custody or under local police, GNB, PNB, or SEBIN’s
control.134 Further, it will likely find that the pain and
suffering suffered by civilians was the result of the officers’
unlawful treatment. 135 The gruesome methods, which
included sexual violence, likely demonstrate that the torture
was knowingly committed, and that the officers’ intended to

Id.
Id.
132 Id.
133 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 34.
134 See id. at 33.
135 See id. at 34.
130
131
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carry out orders, but also to do the greatest damage possible
in support of state policy. 136
b. WIDESPREAD OR SYSTEMATIC ATTACK DIRECTED
AGAINST A CIVILIAN POPULATION.
The ICC has interpreted the civilian population
qualifier to mean “groups distinguishable by nationality,
ethnicity or other distinguishable features,” including
groups defined by its perceived political affiliation. 137 CAH
must have been committed as part of a “widespread or
systematic” attack against such groups. 138 The underlying
principle was to exclude isolated and random acts, and
ordinary crimes under national law, from the ambit of
CAH. 139 As such, the state or organizational policy mandate
of Article 7(2)(a), is a necessary component of the
widespread or systematic attack on the civilian
population. 140

See OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 33-34.
Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 444 (citing Situation in the Republic of
Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohamend Hussein Ali (Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11)
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute, para.110 (ICC Pre-Trail Chamber II (Jan. 23,
2012))) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Kenyatta].
138 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at art. 7(1) (emphasis added).
139 Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age, 107
AM. J. INT'L L. 334, 353 n. 136 (2013) (relying on Machteld Boot, Rodney
Dixon & Christopher K. Hall, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 117, 127
(Otto Triffterer ed., 1999)). [hereinafter Sadat on CAH].
140 Id. at 353, n. 136 (relying on Machteld Boot, Rodney Dixon &
Christopher K. Hall, Article 7: Crimes Against Humanity, in Commentary on
136
137
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CAH must involve crimes “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack.” 141 Although there does not appear to be a per se
state-action requirement, there does need to be some plan on
behalf of some organization. 142 So the Rome Statute
eliminates a strict state-action requirement, but the
defendant must have committed CAH as part of a plan and
not for purely personal motives. 143 Further, the ICC Pretrial
Chamber II has concluded that an organization is established
by sufficient evidence of (1) a hierarchically structured
organization; (2) the existence of an effective system
ensuring compliance by members with the rules and orders
imposed by higher levels of command; (3) training and
quasi-military characteristics; and (4) exercise of control over
geographic areas and its population. 144
The Venezuelan government did not conceal its
intention to violate the population’s human rights or to
murder civilians. 145 In fact, in April 2017, Maduro
announced the Zamora Plan with which he intended to arm
a million civilian militias (colectivos), assuring there would be
“a rifle for each militia member” to respond to the
protests. 146 A second phase of the Zamora Plan was

the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 117, 127 (Otto Triffterer
ed., 1999)).
141 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art 7 (2)(a).
142 Sadat, supra note 140, at 156.
143 Id. at 156-57.
144 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 451 (citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Pre
Trial Chamber II ¶ 228).
145 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 5.
146 Id.
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launched a month later. 147 While there is no accessible public
or official document explaining what Plan Zamora entails,
military and public officials have referred to it to justify the
use of military jurisdiction for civilians and to deploy the
GNB to control demonstrations. 148 The implementation of
the Zamora Plan resulted in increased violence against
demonstrators. 149
Consequently, state officers systematically used
disproportionate force to suppress anti-government protests.
Venezuelan security forces—including the Bolivarian
National Guard (GNB), the Bolivarian National Police
(PNB), the Bolivarian National Intelligence Services (SEBIN),
and local police—aided by colectivos murdered, imprisoned,
and tortured Venezuelan groups distinguishable by their
opposition to the Maduro regime. 150 The officers’ use of
extreme and lethal force, caused hundreds of deaths and
injuries. 151
Colectivos are civilian armed-groups that the Maduro
regime and the state armed forces have leveraged to commit
CAH in Venezuela. Although this Article does not elaborate
further on this point, the OTP will likely consider colectivos
quasi-state actors because they have established (1) a
hierarchically structured organization; (2) an effective
system ensuring compliance by members with the rules and
orders imposed by higher levels of command exists; (3) they
possess training and quasi-military characteristics; and (4)

OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 8.
Id. at 8.
149 Id.
150 See Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 54.
151 See id. at 1.
147
148
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they exercise of control over geographic areas and its
population. 152 Moreover, the association of colectivos and
official armed-forces was apparent. Notably, colectivos
alongside or in-sight of security forces suppressed
demonstrations, at times, shooting live ammunition at
protesters and detaining individuals who were then turned
over to the security forces. 153
Lastly, the widespread murder, imprisonment, and
torture of civilians by state armed-forces and colectivos were
not isolated and random acts. The crimes were carried out
repeatedly, across thirteen states and Caracas—including in
controlled environments such as military installations and
other state institutions—between April and August 2017. 154
Hence the OTP will likely find that state armed-forces and
colectivos committed the widespread murder, imprisonment,
and torture of civilians pursuant to or in furtherance of a
state or organizational policy of the Maduro regime. 155

See Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 451 (citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ¶
228).
153 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 55. Illustrative of this
argument is that on July 5, 2017, colectivos attacked and surrounded the
then opposition-controlled National Assembly in Caracas for several
hours. Id. This attack occurred in plain sight of security armed-forces,
who appeared to do little to protect the institution or disperse the progovernment armed groups. Id.
154 Crackdown on Dissent, supra note 7, at 2.
155 Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7 (2)(a).
152

2018

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN VENEZUELA

161

c. WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE ATTACK.
CAH must be committed with knowledge of the
As a matter of law, an attack directed against any
civilian population need not be attributed to the person
charged, neither does the person charged need to be the
leader, or even a member, of the organization within the
meaning of Article 7(2)(a). 157 So the Statute does not require
a tight link between the accused and the organization
bearing the policy to commit the widespread or systematic
attack. 158
In April 2017, the Maduro regime introduced the
Zamora Plan, which called on colectivos and armed-forces to
assist in responding to protests. 159 Notably, OHCHR’s
analysis revealed that, based on the types of injuries suffered
by demonstrators, the use of force progressively escalated
upon the implementation of Plan Zamora. 160 So Venezuela’s
President, (Maduro), Defense Minister (Padrino López), and
Interior Secretary (Reverol) likely had knowledge of the
crimes committed by state armed-forces and colectivos
supporters of the regime. Moreover, reporters found no
evidence that key high-level officials—including those who
attack. 156

See id. at Art. 7(1).
Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 450 (citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ¶ 223).
The term “state or organizational policy” applies to organizations within
the state such as the military, police, or intelligence services. See also
Rome Statute, supra note 14, at Art. 7 (2)(a).
158 Van Schaack, supra note 13, at 451 (citing Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, para.
223).
159 OAS Third Report, supra note 71, at 20.
160 OHCHR Report, supra note 80, at 8.
156
157
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knew or should have known about the widespread crimes—
had taken any steps to prevent and punish the crimes. 161
Lastly, the world has seen the brutal force used to
prevent citizens from demonstrating against the Maduro
regime in Venezuela. 162 Maduro, Padrino López, and
Reverol’s knowledge of the crimes is simply undeniable, and
as such the OTP would likely conclude.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ICC can bring justice to Venezuelan victims, and
the OTP has taken the first step by initiating a preliminary
examination. During its review, the OTP will likely find a
reasonable basis to believe that the heinous crimes
committed in thirteen states and Caracas, between April and
August 2017, are CAH. Likely, it will also find that the
Maduro regime controls the Venezuelan judiciary as to
render it unwilling and unable to genuinely prosecute the
potential defendants. Accordingly, the Court can admit the
case and assert jurisdiction.
The OTP will likely find that the Venezuelan
government did not conceal its intention to harm civilians
distinguishable because of their opposition to the Maduro
regime. Maduro intended to arm colectivos, justified the use
of military jurisdiction for civilians, and deployed the GNB
to deter protesters under the Zamora Plan. Upon the Plan’s

161 Crackdown on Dissent Report, supra note 7, at 2. The Maduro regime
had also publicly targeted political opponents such as Leopoldo López
and Antonio Ledezma. OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 6. These
intimidating actions show that the Maduro regime sought to silence
political opponents and, through them, the Venezuelan people. Id.
162 OAS Fourth Report, supra note 71, at 22.
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implementation, violence against demonstrators increased,
and state-forces and colectivos systematically murdered,
imprisoned, and tortured hundreds of demonstrators. So the
heinous crimes resulted from a plan or organized policy, or
from an abuse of power or official capacity. The conduct left
at least two million displaced persons and approximately
620 political prisoners. Hence the OTP will likely conclude
the crimes were committed as part of a widespread and
systematic attack, directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack.
The international community has finally heard
Venezuelans’ SOS call. The OHCHR, OAS’s Secretary
General, Human Rights Watch, CASLA, and Foro Penal
Venezolano are among the institutions that have loudly
condemned the CAH committed in Venezuela by the
Maduro regime. But whether the ICC will ultimately bring
justice to the Venezuelan victims remains to be seen, as the
Court will face may obstacles, including getting custody of
Venezuela’s President, Nicolás Maduro, Defense Minister,
Vladimir Padrino López, and Interior Secretary, Néstor
Reverol. For now, the ICC preliminary examination of the
situation in Venezuela feels like a victory for Venezuelan
victims. Venezuelan victims have lost many battles, many
have lost their lives. So hope is, for now, what they continue
to hold on to.
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